Franklin v. Facebook by Northern District of Georgia
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
ORDER 
 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Facebook, Inc.’s Motion 
to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), Dkt. No. [15]. For the reasons 
set forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 
I. Factual Background 
Plaintiff Ricky Franklin initiated this action on April 29, 2015, as a pro se 
litigant. According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, his claims arise out of a series of text 
messages Defendant sent to Plaintiff’s cell phone without Plaintiff’s consent. Dkt. 
No. [3] at ¶¶ 1-2 & 20-25. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s delivery of said 
unsolicited text messages is a violation of both the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C.  § 227, as well as O.C.G.A. § 46-5-27. Id.  
 Defendant filed its Motion to Transfer Venue on July 21, 2015. Dkt. No. 
[15]. Defendant concurrently filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. [16]. In 
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its memorandum in support of its motion to transfer, Defendant argues that 
because Plaintiff is a Facebook user, he is contractually bound by Facebook’s 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (“SRR”), which outlines the terms of use 
for all Facebook account holders. [15-1] at 6-7. Defendant asserts that in order to 
sign up for his Facebook account in 2009, Plaintiff was required to indicate that 
he agreed to Defendant’s SRR. Id. at 6; [15-2] at 2-3. Specifically, the Facebook 
registration process in place at the time Plaintiff registered for an account 
informed people signing up for the service: “By clicking Sign Up, you are 
indicating that you have read and agree to the Terms of Use.” Id. at 3. The phrase 
“Terms of Use” was an underlined hyperlink directing users to the SRR. Id. 
Defendant further contends that Plaintiff is presently a Facebook user and has 
been given notice that his “continued use” of the service constitutes “acceptance” 
of any amendments to the SRR. Id. at 2, 3-4. The SRR contains a forum selection 
clause requiring that “any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim)” that an 
agreeing user may have with Defendant “arising out of or relating to this 
Statement or Facebook” be brought exclusively in either “the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California or a state court located in San Mateo 
County.” [15-3] at 4. Defendant thus asks that the Court transfer venue under § 
1404(a) to the Northern District of California in accordance with the forum 
selection clause. 
 Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s motion to transfer on July 31, 2015. Dkt. 
No. [17]. In his response, Plaintiff argues that transfer is improper because (1) a 
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plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to great weight, id. at 2-3; (2) the majority of 
the factors relevant to a § 1404(a) transfer decision, as enumerated by the 
Eleventh Circuit in Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 
2005), weigh in Plaintiff’s favor, id. at 3-4; (3) Plaintiff’s claims are unrelated to 
Plaintiff’s own use of Facebook, and the Court should accordingly treat Plaintiff’s 
claims as an “exceptional case” not within the scope of the forum selection clause, 
id. at 4-6; and (4) public interest factors weigh against transfer. Id. at 6-7.1 
II. Discussion 
Although a forum selection clause “does not render venue in a court 
‘wrong’ or ‘improper’ within the meaning of § 1406(a) or Rule 12(b)(3), the clause 
may be enforced through a motion to transfer under § 1404(a).” Atl. Marine 
Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 579 (2013). 28 
U.S.C.  § 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 
district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or 
division to which all parties have consented.” (emphasis added). Thus, if a forum 
selection clause is found to be valid and enforceable, the Court must enforce it by 
granting a motion to transfer to the forum agreed upon therein. A valid forum 
                                               
1 Pro se pleadings “are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by 
attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United 
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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selection clause “should be given controlling weight in all but the most 
exceptional cases.” Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581. 
A.  Validity of the Forum Selection Clause 
Forum selection clauses “are presumptively valid and enforceable unless 
the plaintiff makes a ‘strong showing’ that enforcement would be unfair or 
unreasonable under the circumstances.” Krenkel v. Kerzner Int’l Hotels Ltd., 579 
F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 
U.S. 585, 593-595 (1991)). The Eleventh Circuit further explained: 
A forum-selection clause will be invalidated when (1) its formation 
was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) the plaintiff would be 
deprived of its day in court because of inconvenience or unfairness; 
(3) the chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) 
enforcement of the clause would contravene public policy. In 
determining whether there was fraud or overreaching in a non-
negotiated forum-selection clause, we look to whether the clause was 
reasonably communicated to the consumer. A useful two-part test of 
“reasonable communicativeness” takes into account the clause’s 
physical characteristics and whether the plaintiffs had the ability to 
become meaningfully informed of the clause and to reject its terms. 
 
Krenkel, 579 F.3d at 1281 (internal citations omitted). 
Defendant’s SRR governs the legal relationship between Defendant and 
millions of users of its website and related services. Because of this, the forum 
selection clause contained in the SRR has been addressed by numerous courts in 
actions involving Defendant. The Court cannot identify a single instance where 
any federal court has struck down Defendant’s SRR as an impermissible contract 
of adhesion induced by fraud or overreaching or held the forum selection clause 
now at issue to be otherwise unenforceable due to public policy considerations. 
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See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 838-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(likening Facebook’s SRR to the fine print on the back of a cruise ticket 
containing a forum selection clause that was enforced against the plaintiffs in 
Carnival Cruise Lines); E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 
894, 900-903 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (imputing “constructive knowledge” of the terms of 
the SRR to the plaintiffs and finding Facebook’s forum selection clause to be 
mandatory, reasonable, not in contravention of public policy, and enforceable); 
Miller v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-2810-RLV, 2010 WL 9525523, at *1 (N.D. 
Ga. Jan. 15, 2010) (also likening the SRR’s forum selection clause to the one at 
issue in Carnival Cruise Lines and additionally noting the public policy concern 
that “[e]ven if the court were to assume without deciding that the [SRR] was a 
contract of adhesion, striking the forum selection clause could wreak havoc on 
the entire social-networking internet industry.”). The Court finds the reasoning of 
these cases persuasive, declines to depart from the great weight of persuasive 
authority on this question, and accordingly finds that Plaintiff has failed to 
overcome the presumptive validity of the forum selection clause on the basis of 
fraud, overreaching, or contravention of public policy.   
B.  Scope of the Forum Selection Clause 
The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s claims are indeed contemplated by the 
SRR and are therefore subject to the forum selection clause. The clause states 
that “any claim . . . arising out of or relating to . . . Facebook” must be brought in 
either the Northern District of California or a state court located in San Mateo 
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County. Dkt. No. [15-3] at 4. The SRR defines “Facebook” as “the features and 
services we make available, including through (a) our website at 
www.facebook.com . . . and (d) other media, brands, products, services, software 
(such as a toolbar), devices, or networks now existing or later developed.” Id. The 
language of the forum selection clause is therefore broad enough to include 
Plaintiff’s claims, which “relat[e] to Facebook” because they relate to a “service[]” 
Defendant “make[s] available.” Specifically, they relate to the service of providing 
Facebook account notifications to a user’s cell phone number via text message, a 
service that was apparently sought out by some prior owner of Defendant’s cell 
phone number.2 Plaintiff’s claims therefore do not constitute an “exceptional 
case” falling outside of the forum selection clause. See Miller, 2010 WL 9525523, 
at *2 (granting a similar motion to transfer and holding that the use of the term 
“any dispute” in SRR’s forum selection clause was “broad enough to include” the 
plaintiff’s patent infringement claims where the alleged infringement “occurred 
                                               
2 Plaintiff describes the content of only one text message he allegedly received 
from Defendant, which read: “Today is Sara Glenn’s birthday. Reply to post on 
her Timeline or reply 1 to post ‘Happy Birthday!’” Dkt. No. [3] at 6. Given that 
Plaintiff states that he was “[c]onfused and baffled” by this message and “that he 
was receiving text messages from someone or a Corporation that he does not 
know,” id., the messages at issue in this action were apparently intended for some 
prior owner of Plaintiff’s cell phone number. The SRR contemplates such a 
scenario: “In the event you change or deactivate your mobile telephone number, 
you will update your account information on Facebook within 48 hours to ensure 
that your messages are not sent to the person who acquires your old number.” 
Dkt. No. [15-3] at 3. While neither party explicitly articulates how or why the 
messages were sent or received, the record at hand supports the finding that they 
were sent pursuant to a service made available by Defendant to its users 
generally. 
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either on Facebook’s website or in the use of Facebook’s site,” even though—as in 
the present case—the alleged infringement did not arise from the plaintiff’s own 
use of the site but rather from a third party’s use). The Court therefore rejects 
Plaintiff’s third argument against transfer. 
C.  Private Interest Factors  
Plaintiff also raises two other potential avenues to invalidating the forum 
selection clause. As outlined above, a forum selection clause may also be 
invalidated if Plaintiff can show that he would be “deprived of [his] day in court 
because of inconvenience or unfairness” or that “the chosen law would deprive 
[him] of a remedy.” Krenkel, 579 F.3d at 1281 (internal citations omitted). 
However, the Supreme Court has clarified since the Eleventh Circuit issued its 
per curiam opinion in Krenkel that private interest factors such as inconvenience 
or unfairness are not relevant where a motion to transfer is based on a valid 
forum selection clause. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581-82. While a typical § 1404(a) 
analysis would take into account the convenience of the parties and various other 
factors that Plaintiff now urges the Court to consider, the Supreme Court has 
explained that where the parties are bound by a valid forum selection clause, “the 
[§ 1404(a)] calculus changes” in three ways: 
First, the plaintiff's choice of forum merits no weight. Rather, as the 
party defying the forum-selection clause, the plaintiff bears the 
burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for which the 
parties bargained is unwarranted. . . . 
 
Second, a court evaluating a defendant's § 1404(a) motion to transfer 
based on a forum-selection clause should not consider arguments 
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about the parties’ private interests. When parties agree to a forum-
selection clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected 
forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their 
witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation. A court accordingly 
must deem the private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of 
the preselected forum. . . .  
 
As a consequence, a district court may consider arguments about 
public-interest factors only. Because those factors will rarely defeat a 
transfer motion, the practical result is that forum-selection clauses 
should control except in unusual cases. . . .  
 
Third, when a party bound by a forum-selection clause flouts its 
contractual obligation and files suit in a different forum, a § 1404(a) 
transfer of venue will not carry with it the original venue's choice-of-
law rules—a factor that in some circumstances may affect public-
interest considerations. 
 
Id. at 581-82. Accordingly, the Court must find that Plaintiff’s choice of forum 
merits no weight, that Plaintiff has waived the right to challenge the preselected 
forum as inconvenient, and that private interest factors weigh entirely in favor of 
litigation in the Northern District of California.  
 D.  Public Interest Factors  
Having addressed Plaintiff’s first three arguments against transfer, the 
Court now turns to public interest factors, including “whether the chosen law 
would deprive [Plaintiff] of a remedy.” Krenkel, 579 F.3d at 1281. Plaintiff argues 
that transfer is against the public interest because a change of venue would 
“eliminate Plaintiff[’]s state claims” under O.C.G.A. § 46-5-27 and because the 
Georgia General Assembly and Georgia courts have an “overwhelming interest” 
in resolving disputes involving Georgia residents and Georgia law. Dkt. No. [17] 
at 6-7. The forum selection clause of the SRR does indeed dictate that California 
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state law will govern any claim Plaintiff has against Defendant. Dkt. No. [15-3] at 
4. However, the Court finds that the potential public interest in preserving 
Plaintiff’s Georgia statutory claim is not weighty enough to defeat Defendant’s 
transfer motion, because Plaintiff’s claims, as alleged, simply do not fall within 
the contemplation of any Georgia statute.  
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts: “O.C.G.A. § 46-5-27(i) states that any person 
who has received more than one telephone solicitation within any 12 month 
period by or on behalf of the same person or entity in violation of subsection (c) 
or (g) of the code, may bring an action for such violation.” Dkt. No. [3] at ¶ 2. Yet 
O.C.G.A. § 46-5-27(c) and (g) both deal solely with certain prohibitions on 
“telephone solicitation.”3 Elsewhere, the statute defines “telephone solicitation” 
as “voice communication over a telephone line for the purpose of encouraging the 
purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services[.]” Id. at 
(b)(3) (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not allege that he has received any voice 
communications from Defendant, and there is no Georgia statute comparable to 
O.C.G.A. § 46-5-27 prohibiting similar telephone solicitations sent via text 
message. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that the communications were “for 
                                               
3 Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 46-5-27(c) prohibits “telephone solicitation to the 
telephone line of any residential, mobile, or wireless subscriber in this state who 
has given notice to the [Federal Communications Commission] . . . of such 
subscriber’s objection to receiving telephone solicitations,” and O.C.G.A. § 46-5-
27(g) requires that anyone making a telephone solicitation “state clearly the 
identity of the person or entity initiating the call” and prohibits such person or 
entity from “knowingly utiliz[ing] any method to block or otherwise circumvent 
such subscriber’s use of a caller identification service.”  
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the purpose of encouraging” Plaintiff to make any “purchase or rental of, or 
investment in, property, goods, or services.” Rather, the sole text message 
described in the Complaint encourages Plaintiff to wish someone a happy 
birthday—a presumably costless transaction. 
 The Court is careful to note that its findings with regard to Plaintiff’s 
O.C.G.A. § 46-5-27 claim are not intended to address the merits of Plaintiff’s 
claims, which are best left to the transferee court. Rather, the foregoing analysis 
is limited to an evaluation of whether any significant public interest is implicated 
by the fact that enforcement of the forum selection clause will necessarily deprive 
Plaintiff of a remedy under O.C.G.A. § 46-5-27. The Court answers that question 
in the negative. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue is 
GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to transfer this case to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California.4 
 
  
                                               
4 As previously mentioned, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 
Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the same day 
it filed its motion to transfer. Dkt. No. [16]. Defendant argues that the Court 
should defer that motion to the transferee court in the event the motion to 
transfer is granted. [15-1] at 6 n.1. The Court agrees. Because Defendant’s motion 
to transfer is granted, the motion to dismiss is properly left for the transferee 
court to decide. See, e.g., Reginald Martin Agency, Inc. v. Conseco Med. Ins. Co., 
No. 1:03 CV 3810 RWS, 2004 WL 3576601, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2004). 
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of November, 2015.  
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